
# Digital Disruption in Banking

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#### Bank price-to-book ratios



### Impact of digital disruption

- Moves the sector to be customer-centered with an upgraded customer experience.
- Leaves incumbents with obsolete technologies (e.g. rigid mainframes) and an overextended branch network while new generations want to bank with the mobile phone.
- The industry is facing a deep restructuring.

# FinTech advantages & disadvantages

Advantage	Disadvantage
Superior technology free of legacy	Absence of an installed, loyal
systems; leaner operation	customer base
Friendly consumer interface and	Limited access to soft information
new standard of consumer	
experience	
Focus on activities/business	Lack of reputation and brand
segments with higher ROEs	recognition
More equity funding	High cost of capital
Able to attract best talent	

**BigTech** platforms have the advantages of fintechs with <u>none of the</u> <u>drawbacks</u> (plus superior data, technology, deep pocket) → potential more severe disruption for the traditional banking business.

# Strategies: incumbents and fintechs


Incumbents strategies (Discriminate by segment)	Fintech strategies
<ul> <li>Accommodate ('fat-cat')</li> <li>In the presence of high switching costs</li> <li>To gain interchange fees paid to them by new service operators</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Commit to remain small ('puppy-dog ploy')</li> <li>No banking license</li> <li>E.g. with P2P lending that serves unbanked segments of population</li> <li>→ Form partnership</li> </ul>
<ul><li>Fight, prevent entry ('top dog')</li><li>Shutdown/degrade access to infrastructure</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Entry as a (licensed) digital bank</li> <li>Less likely given the high compliance costs involved.</li> <li>→ Consolidate or sell to incumbents</li> </ul>
Launch their own fully online banks	

- Advantage of partnership
  - Incumbents benefit from IT knowledge and regulatory arbitrage.
  - Entrants experience lighter regulation, or reach new customers, benefit from established brand, economies of scale and distribution channels of incumbents.

# Strategies: incumbents and bigtechs

Incumbents	Bigtechs
<ul> <li>Accommodate</li> <li>Cooperate with partnerships</li> <li>Provide specialized unique banking products and services</li> </ul>	• Partnerships
<ul> <li>Fight/Compete head-to-head by becoming platform/marketplace</li> <li>Profit from superior trust (?) from customers and data security</li> <li>Better regulatory navigation skills</li> <li>Cannot match bigtechs' bundling/cross-subsidization strategy with complementary financial and non-financial products/services</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Become banks/intermediaries bundling their offerings and exploiting economies of scope         <ul> <li>Opt not to accept deposits to avoid regulation</li> </ul> </li> <li>Multi-sided platform (marketplace)         <ul> <li>Platform envelopment</li> <li>Gatekeeper: Monopolize interface with customers</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

#### The future?




#### Scenarios

- First impact of digital disruption will
  - increase competition;
  - erode incumbents margins; and
  - increase competitive pressure and contestability.
- Incumbents will have to restructure:
  - The current overcapacity together with the need to invest heavily in information technology in a low profitability environment will lead to consolidation.
- Long run impact will depend on
  - extent of entry of BigTech (modulo regulation) and
  - whether a few bigtechs (perhaps including some platformtransformed incumbents) manage to monopolize the interface with customers and appropriate the rents in the business.

### Regulation and financial stability (1)

- Level playing field?
  - EBA consultation: more than 30% of fintechs reported to be unregulated
  - "Open banking": asymmetry in information sharing requirements between PSD2 and GDPR.
  - Data ownership, portability, and interoperability are key.
  - Market fragmentation and impediment of international operations caused by cross-border asymmetries in data protection regimes.
  - Different compliance burden for dominant players and small entrants (UK)?
  - Regulate activities but entities are those that fail:
    - Tradeoff between regulating by activity, which fosters a level playing field, and protecting against systemic risk of failed entities.
- Heightened regulatory pressure fosters shadow (fintech) banking
  - e.g. US with GSE guarantee.

# Disposition of mortgage loans of shadow banks



Source: Fig. 4 in Buchak et al. (2017)

# Regulation and financial stability (2)


- Increased competitive pressure decrease profits of incumbents and increases risk-taking.
- New sources of systemic risk:
  - Contamination of bank and non-bank activities in platforms.
  - Interconnectedness /"step-in" risk arising from ownership, partnership or sponsorship.
  - Failure of third-party providers and cyberattacks.
- Consumer protection
  - Data privacy.
  - Integrity of process, traceability of transactions (liability if breach?).
  - Price discrimination. Transparency and behavioral biases.

# COMPETITION AND STABILITY IN BANKING THE ROLE OF REGULATION AND **COMPETITION POLICY**

**XAVIER VIVES** 

# A question of balance





#### Other references

- Vives, X. Competition and Stability in Banking: The Role of Competition Policy and Regulation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, pp. 344.
- Vives, X. "Competition and Stability in Modern Banking: A post-Crisis Perspective", *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 2019, 64, 55-69.
- http://blog.iese.edu/xvives/